Phenomena of Happiness

1. Phenomena of happiness constitute Stratum I of the field of happiness. However, it should be remembered that phenomena are not identified in isolation, separate from happiness-related concepts, theories or even doctrines. Phenomena always accompany concepts and theories. It is when two theories of happiness confront each other that we can dissociate one or more phenomena as if they subsisted independently of them. Consequently, phenomena should not be confused with facts in the positivist sense.

Likewise, it is greatly relevant to note that the term “phenomenon” is not taken here in the Kantian sense: “phenomenon” as opposed to  “NOUmenon”. Because, in fact, this definition that presents phenomenon in opposition to noumenon (found in philosophical literature from the times of Kant to Husserl) carries serious idealistic connotations connected to the idea of the transcendental subject, incompatible with philosophical materialism.

The notion of phenomenon that we postulate is, on the contrary, much closer to the Hellenic sense expressed in the phrase “saving the phenomena” (sozein ta phainomena). Phenomena, far from standing in opposition to noumenon –as unknowable or hidden– are correlative to essences.

2. With regards to phenomena as we are understanding them here, we identify a number of defining features. First of all, phenomena are contents of the World that stand out because of a certain rarity or anomaly that will have to be accounted for.

Secondly, a phenomenon presupposes the existence of several subjects to whom it manifests in a different way; in this sense it must be said that miraculous phenomena can only be understood as phenomena if such “miracles” concern “cinematographic matter”, that is, if they are capable of being depicted in images.

Thirdly, the phenomenon is presented to each subject as idiographic or quasi-idiographic, but it does not cease to have repeatability or universality in a noetic sense.

Fourthly, taking up what we have said in the previous section, every phenomenon is constitutive of a structure or essence.

Finally, phenomena, in the Hellenic sense to which we refer, are characterized by their corrigibility in relation to the frameworks in which they appear; hence, it follows that a phenomenon can be obscure and confused. In any case, phenomena must be corporeal and therefore always contain some referent.

3. The multiplicity of happiness-related phenomena is evidence that manifests itself in the positive sense of the term “happiness”, where what we call “happy” as positive content refers to the specific grammatical subject in expressions such as “happy meadow” or “happy hen”. Or, in the words of the Delphic oracle, Anglao Psofidio would be “the happiest man on Earth”.

Now, when happiness is interpreted as everlasting laetitia or bliss in God, it can only be the limit of a sequence of ideas, not a phenomenon. Phenomena pertain to several domains, and they do not form part of a continuum. Rather, they are discrete, and must be recognised in symploke: combined so that each one does not interact with the others, nor kept isolated from the totality.

We can establish four major classes of phenomena-encompassing domains: A₁) the subjective (individual) domains; A₂) the supra-individual subjective domains; B) the objectual, organic or inorganic domains; C) incorporeal objects such as triangles, groups, rings, &c.

The domain of subjective (individual) phenomena refers to the corporeal subjects in such a way that each corporeal subject as a subjective domain is interwoven with other subjective domains. In the natural order, we could refer to physiological phenomena (gymnastics, food, massages, “hippocampal devices”); in the cultural order, we must refer to ethological phenomena such as when it is said that the animals in the reserve live in “good, happy conditions”, even when – despite Russell – the attribution of happiness to these cases is doubtful. We could speak in a similar way about the phenomena related to lactating humans’ “happy childhoods”.

The domain of supra-individual subjective phenomena refers us to “happiness phenomena” related to social and public life involving groups, families, nations, &c. This is the domain in which the Beatus ille (regarding those who seek happiness away from the city) could be inscribed. But this has already been elaborated from a particular theory of happiness, such as Epicureanism. Other supra-individual phenomena are organized around historically institutionalized celebrations, feasts, jubilees, rites of passage, &c.

Objective domains constituted by non-subjective bodies (organic or inorganic) refer us to numerous phenomena given in extrasomatic culture. Let us mention, before anything else, architectural structures, such as the temple that Lucullus built in Rome (74 BC) to the goddess of happiness; or the statue to the goddess Felicitas Publica. Other examples might be coins, appliances, utensils and objects in general considered happiness-related – apart from drugs, tranquilizers, euphoriants, &c. Furthermore, there are not only positive but also negative happiness-related objects (prisons, whips, spiked belts, &c.).

Finally, should we not consider incorporeal objects such as triangles, geometries, &c., or other abstract structures “happiness phenomena” when they refer to the attainment of happiness precisely because of their structures? For instance, when the geometric structure of a city is supposed to guarantee by itself the happiness of its inhabitants (the well-tempered city)?